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From Receding to Reseeding: Industrial Policy, Governance
Strategies and Neoliberal Resilience in Post-crisis Britain
Craig Berry
Department of Economics, Policy and International Business, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
ABSTRACT
Industrial policy has been on the agenda of British policy elites since the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, particularly since Theresa May became Prime
Minister in 2016. This has been seen as a challenge to pre-crisis norms
of economic governance associated with neoliberalism. This article
explores key aspects of industrial policy development in post-crisis
Britain – new forms of vertical support for industry, local government
reform, and the public ﬁnancing of private sector R&D – in order to
sketch a new understanding of political and ideological change. It
focuses on the institutional mechanisms through which industrial
strategy will ostensibly be implemented, including subnational and
private spheres of governance. The article argues that recent industrial
policy developments do not represent the receding of neoliberalism, but
rather have provided opportunities for the reseeding of neoliberal
norms in British economic statecraft. The strategy has reinforced forms
of state machinery through which pre-crisis elite practice can be
maintained and legitimated. By demonstrating that the apparent revival
of state intervention in the wake of capitalist crises must not be
assumed automatically to challenge pre-crisis economic orders, and
highlighting the crucial role of exigent political circumstances, the article
makes an important contribution to the literature on neoliberal resilience.
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This article explores the formation and implementation of industrial policy in post-crisis Britain, in
order to explore the evolution of neoliberal economic statecraft following episodes in which neoli-
beralism’s legitimacy has seemingly been challenged. A renewed interest among policy-makers in
industrial policy has been evident since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. The Conservative-Liberal Demo-
crat coalition government formed in 2010 also ostensibly pursued a more expansive industrial policy
agenda. However, it was the ascent of Theresa May to the premiership in 2016 after the Brexit refer-
endum (initially inheriting the small parliamentary majority the Conservatives had won in 2015,
before leading a minority government after the 2017 ‘snap’ election) that gave most impetus to
the development of an ‘industrial strategy’. May oversaw the establishment of the Department of
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and the publication of a landmark white paper on
industrial strategy in 2017 (BEIS 2017c). She both explicitly and implicitly endorsed industrial strategy
upon taking oﬃce, and during the 2017 election campaign, as part of building ‘an economy that
works everyone’ in the wake of the Brexit vote (May 2016b, 2016c, Conservative Party 2017).
Industrial policy is understood here as policy interventions which ‘stimulate economic activities
and promote structural change’ (Rodrik 2009: 2). The distinction between the horizontal and vertical
industrial policy is often employed, with the former focused on supporting the private sector as a
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whole, and the latter on particular industries or ﬁrms. A horizontal approach has tended to prevail in
the UK, although a vertical or ‘targeted’ approach focused on capital-intense manufacturing indus-
tries, which drive productivity improvements and are integral to domestic export bases (see
Chang 2009), tends to characterise industrial policy in most countries. Recent developments in the
UK strongly suggest the addition of (further) vertical interventions to complement a predominantly
horizontal approach.
In signifying the legitimacy of the state intervening in the market in order to steer economic pro-
cesses, industrial policy is often understood as a disavowal of economic governance norms associ-
ated with neoliberal ideology. The emergence of an industrial strategy in Britain sits somewhere
awkwardly therefore alongside a political economy literature which emphasises continuities in econ-
omic policy practice, and the ways in which even novel policy instruments have served to restore a
neoliberal growth model challenged by the events of 2008 and their aftermath (Hay 2013, Berry and
Hay 2016, Lavery 2019). This article, and the example of industrial policy, oﬀers a subtle variation on
this latter argument. While it would be too crude to describe Britain’s industrial policy renaissance –
particularly May’s post-Brexit industrial strategy – as a neoliberal agenda, nor does it straightforwardly
represent a receding of neoliberalism’s inﬂuence over economic policy. Instead, in seeking to build
upon pre- and post-crisis policy practice, the May government’s industrial strategy agenda oﬀered
opportunities for the reseeding of neoliberalism in Britain’s economic policy architecture even
while its legitimacy was challenged rhetorically.
The article surveys1 recent industrial policy developments in Britain, in historical context, to eluci-
date this argument, focusing in particular on the institutional mechanisms through which an indus-
trial strategy will be developed and operationalised, and over which, crucially, Theresa May as Prime
Minister was not in complete control. Accordingly, this analysis contributes to the growing literature
on the evolution of neoliberal resilience (see Schmidt and Thatcher 2014b), and related literatures on
neoliberal varieties (see Ban 2016, Carstensen and Matthijs 2018) and the neoliberal state (Weiss
2012, Schmidt and Woll 2014) – arguing that the role of both context-speciﬁc institutional processes
and political contingency has been under-emphasised in accounts of neoliberalism’s resilience.
The article discusses British industrial policy development across three of the main domains
through which an industrial policy agenda may be enacted: support for particular ﬁrms or industries,
new industrial policy powers for local and regional authorities, and support for R&D. The nature of
policies within the ﬁrst domain denote the extent to which policy-makers rely upon the economy’s
incumbent ﬁrms, and their business models, to deliver strategic objectives. Approaches within the
second domain will denote prevailing ideas about the appropriate scope for state intervention at
various scales. And interventions chosen within the third domain denote understandings of how
state and market should interact across diﬀerent stages of capitalist innovation. Each of these
domains were prominent within the May government’s industrial strategy, as well as, to a variable
extent, having featured in industrial policy development in Britain since 2008. Focusing on these
domains also enables the article to demonstrate the abiding inﬂuence of HM Treasury on all facets
of economic policy, notwithstanding the establishment of BEIS. The article begins by elucidating neo-
liberalism and its apparent resilience, situating the analysis of British industrial policy in relation to the
existing literature in this regard.
Industrial Policy and Neoliberal Resilience
This section locates the article’s analysis in relation to current debates about the nature and evolution
of neoliberalism. Deﬁning neoliberalism is a complex task, but a necessary one. Following William
Davies (2014), it is understood as a foundational set of norms which privilege private and proﬁt-
seeking economic activity as the key source of well-being, centred on an individualist epistemology
which delegitimises collectivist mechanisms for the pursuit of public goods. As such, if industrial
policy validates forms of state intervention focused on reshaping the private economy, does the
UK’s move towards industrial strategy represent a disavowal of neoliberalism? In maintaining that
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the private economic sphere, populated by proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms interacting competitively, is best
placed to determine how wealth should be produced and distributed and, accordingly, societal
welfare pursued, neoliberalism is clearly inconsistent with the notion that the state may play a pur-
poseful role in shaping capitalist development. However, there is a diverse and growing literature on
the vital role that state power plays (in Britain and elsewhere) in supporting neoliberalism (Weiss,
2012, Davies, 2014, Mirowski, 2014, Schmidt and Woll, 2014). The state is essential to the architecture
within which private economic activity operates, and has intervened in novel and signiﬁcant ways
since the crisis to sustain a British growth model associated with neoliberalism (Hay 2013, Berry
2016a, Lavery, 2019). Yet neoliberal statecraft invariably involves self-imposed limits on the state’s
ability to reorient privately determined business models.
Cornel Ban’s work is instructive in this regard. Inﬂuenced by Karl Polanyi, Ban posits a distinction
between ‘embedded’ and ‘disembedded’ neoliberalism, with the diﬀerence related primarily to the
extent to which the states acts ‘to buﬀer the broader society against the dislocations produced by
market competition and its associated structures of power and privilege’ (Ban 2016, p. 3–4).
However, the applicability of this understanding to industrial policy is not straightforward. The use
of public policy and public resources to support and protect national industries, or enable national
economies as a whole to adapt to international trends, could be deﬁned as a form of ‘buﬀering’,
embedding the pursuit of public goods within the private economic organisation. But what if the
state itself embodies neoliberal norms, geared towards only submissive form of interventionism,
and indeed encompassing opportunities for private economic actors to inﬂuence or capture the
key institutional mechanisms through which intervention is operationalised? The following sections
of this article seek to determine empirically where the balance lies.
Ban’s work draws upon distinct but overlapping literatures on neoliberal variation and resilience.
For Ban, variation occurs as an abstract form of neoliberalism (promoted in part by international insti-
tutions) interacts with extant national conditions (including dominant ideas). Yet neoliberalism also
varies – over time – within a single, domestic context. Carstensen and Matthijs (2018) have argued
that there exist varieties of neoliberalism in recent economic statecraft in Britain, as policy elites
have reframed a neoliberal understanding of the economy in line with their own speciﬁc priorities
within (radically) diﬀerent macroeconomic contexts. The question now is whether May is pursuing
a new neoliberal variety, via industrial strategy. This article suggests that this is the case – but this
does not necessarily mean May oﬀers a neoliberal understanding of industrial policy. Reversing
Ban’s logic, it may be that an extant commitment to neoliberalism within the wider political and insti-
tutional landscape in the UK means the industrial policy is neoliberalised in practice, even if intended
as a (partial) challenge to neoliberal statecraft.
Neoliberal variation is, essentially, a dimension of neoliberalism’s resilience through adaptation.
Vivien A. Schmidt and Thatcher (2014a) argue that neoliberalism’s resilience is enabled by its general-
ity, diversity and mutability in applying its core principles. They identify three main mechanisms of
adaptation. Firstly, metamorphosis, as ‘[c]onstantly shifting policy ideas not only allow neoliberalism
to grow, develop, and spread but also permit its relabelling so that past ideas return in new (dis)-
guises’. Secondly, absorption, as neoliberalism’s ‘loose and ﬂexible framework may develop by
absorbing other ideas, changing labels, and extending its scope’. Thirdly, hybridisation, in which neo-
liberal ideas are ‘married’ to ‘ideational competitors’ in order to produce new policy agendas (Schmidt
and Thatcher 2014a, p. 28; see also Schmidt and Thatcher 2014b, Schmidt 2016).
What is the essential or principal driver of this resilience? Schmidt and Thatcher place explanatory
emphasis on neoliberalism as a set of ‘background ideas’ which are diﬃcult to displace. Carstensen
and Matthijs’ (2018; see also Carstensen and Schmidt 2016) contribution to this literature, noted
above, refers similarly to the ‘ideational power’ of neoliberalism. This encompasses the constraining
power of background ideational processes, but also the persuasive power of particular ideas (and
their advocates), and the institutional power over the proliferation of ideas. The current analysis is
designed to help us to ﬁnesse our understanding of neoliberalism’s resilience in this regard,
especially in moments of political and economic crisis. The constraining and persuasive power of
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neoliberal ideas (and neoliberals) over the nature and scope of industrial policy – and the weakness or
incoherence of alternative approaches (Berry 2016a, p. 38–41) – is certainly relevant here, but this
case would seem to demand more attention on Carstensen and Matthijs’ third face of ideational
power, that is, the institutional dimension. Neoliberal ideas about (or against) industrial policy are
not present by default, but because they are embedded speciﬁcally among actors with positional
advantages and/or indispensable capacities within policy-making and delivery institutions. Moreover,
it is not simply that case that neoliberalism will have resisted ideational challengers – its advocates
may indeed commandeer agendas such as ‘industrial strategy’, at least at the point of delivery, to
renew an ideological mandate under threat. This suggests that neoliberalism’s resilience, or other-
wise, cannot simply be inferred from analysis focused on ideational contestation: the way in which
the speciﬁc political and institutional anatomies of crises – or ‘failures’ (Best 2016) – create opportu-
nities for discredited ideas to be ‘reseeded’ may be critical.
This possibility requires also a focus on the role of contingent political circumstances. Perhaps
even more so than the ideas they host, institutional processes are subject to uncertainties as political
actors devise strategies in pursuit of their objectives, and in response to new political conditions. Car-
stensen and Matthijs (2018) rightly question the emphasis placed on exogenous ‘shocks’ by Peter
Hall’s inﬂuential ‘three orders of policy change’ framework for mapping post-crisis paradigmatic
change (see Hall 1993; see also Blyth 2013, Baker 2015, Berry 2016b). The link explicitly made by
May between Brexit and industrial strategy allows for reﬂection on this issue. It might be that the
2016 Brexit vote, not the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, is the ‘exogenous’ shock that will enable a new indus-
trial policy paradigm to emerge. Crucially, as noted above, this is how it has been narrated by May. At
the same time, however, the actual implications of Brexit for governance are deeply ambivalent. In
triggering a seemingly intractable political crisis, the Brexit vote has made it incredibly diﬃcult for
May to impose her own agenda on relevant institutions in a sustainable manner, even though
Brexit appears to have ostensibly created opportunities for new policy ideas to emerge.
While the growing literatures on the evolution of neoliberal economic statecraft have not system-
atically considered British industrial policy, it is worth noting ﬁnally, and by way of further elucidating
its empirical focus, that the current analysis contributes also to a growing inter-disciplinary literature
on industrial policy in Britain and elsewhere (see Bailey et al. 2015, Berry 2018b; also a special issue of
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, published in July 2019). The addition of a political
economy perspective to this literature is paramount. The nature and operation of industrial policy
have often been subject to analysis by political economists – but largely in relation to emerging econ-
omies, as the industrial policy is deemed constitutive of ‘developmental’ statism (see for example
Evans 1995). The more recent inter-disciplinary literature has succeeded in demonstrating ﬂaws or
limitations of recent British industrial policies, set explicitly or implicitly against Rodrik’s ‘promoting
structural change’ deﬁnition, noted above. Yet the perspectives and objectives of the actual political
actors that have contributed to policy development in this area have been under-investigated.
Speciﬁcally, we must consider the possibility that policy elites may invoke industrial policy or indus-
trial strategy – thereby claiming to promote structural change – as part of a governance strategy
more focused in practice on preserving extant economic structures.
Sector Deals and the Private Sector
British industrial policy since 2008 has seen a gentle strengthening of vertical forms of intervention
into particular industries. The clearest example of this in the 2017 white paper is the promotion of
‘sector deals’, that is, loosely-structured ‘collaborative’ partnerships between government and
private sector bodies in a given industry (BEIS, 2017c, p. 192–3). However, the form taken by
sector deals undermines the notion that the UK has developed a post-neoliberal industrial strategy;
instead, vertical interventions are being inverted to reﬂect key neoliberal norms which were once
reﬂected in the commitment to horizontalism. Speciﬁcally, they create space within the architecture
of British industrial policy for the most powerful ﬁrms to shape policy and its delivery – an institutional
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layer in addition to the space already aﬀorded to favoured industries such as pharmaceuticals. More-
over, the traditional commitment to horizontalism remains evident within industrial policies emanat-
ing from the Treasury rather than BEIS, as part of the Treasury’s ongoing management of British
economic policy in general.
The Industrial Strategy’s New Verticalism
A sector deal would typically involve commitments to invest in a new product, location and/or R&D
activity by a handful of key ﬁrms, in return for reciprocal public sector support in the form of subsidy,
tax relief, removing planning restrictions, infrastructural investment, etc. The May government’s
sector deals policy, and the most substantive of the actual deals now in place, built upon Labour
and coalition government practice. The Labour government established more than twenty sector
skills councils across a range of industries; these are employer-led bodies which managed skills
investment by the Sector Skills Development Agency (SSDA; the SSDA was ultimately replaced by
a looser federation of employer-led councils, underlining private sector leadership in skills provision).
In 2009, Labour also established the Automotive Council for the automotive industry; the Council
published an industrial strategy of its own in 2013, hinged around a coalition government commit-
ment to R&D investment in propulsion technologies (Automotive Council and HM Government 2013).
This was later supplemented by government investment in R&D for battery technology. The latest
automotive sector deal adds further public investment in R&D, matched by council members, in dri-
verless car technology, and a small amount of public money to train ﬁrms in how to support local
supply chains (BEIS 2018). The food and drink industry (covering parts of agriculture, food production,
retail, logistics and hospitality) now also has a sector council, endorsed in 2018 by the May govern-
ment (DEFRA and BEIS 2018), with plans to secure a sector deal.
The sector deal for the so-called ‘life sciences’ industry has attracted a degree of critical attention
(curiously, the deal was also preceded by a sector-speciﬁc industrial strategy, albeit in this case pub-
lished only weeks before the wider industrial strategy white paper was published). Richard Jones
(2017; see also Jones and Wilsdon 2018) has argued that the deﬁnition of the life sciences as an indus-
try or sector (an imaginary which implies private sector organisation), privileges pharmaceutical ﬁrms
at the expense of seeing drug development as part of wider healthcare provision. They will be the
main beneﬁciaries of the new R&D investment highlighted by the deal, which also reinforces the gov-
ernment’s commitment to improving housing and infrastructure in the Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cam-
bridge ‘corridor’ where pharmaceutical ﬁrms are clustered. The House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee (2018b) has ampliﬁed related concerns about the exclusion of the National
Health Service (NHS) from the strategy and deal, which therefore both under-state the public
sector’s role in this part of the economy, and over-state the capacity of the NHS to drive and
absorb innovation.
Large-scale public support for the life sciences industry arguably began under the Labour govern-
ment, which sought to enhance tax relief for pharmaceutical ﬁrms, chieﬂy through the controversial
‘patent box’ which provides for a lower corporation tax rate on proﬁts derived from intellectual prop-
erty. The policy was not implemented until 2013, at a cost of more than £1 billion per year, by the
coalition government (it is worth noting that the value of relief was also eroded by the coalition’s
cuts to corporation tax). The continuation of the patent box was endorsed by the life sciences indus-
trial strategy but, as an already-existing measure, not included in the sector deal. The Institute for
Fiscal Studies has found that the policy does not incentivise innovation, and that beneﬁts accrue
to the largest ﬁrms (it may also breach EU rules on tax competition) (Griﬃth and Miller 2011). Revea-
lingly, the patent box is not mentioned in the industrial strategy white paper – it remains in favour at
the Treasury, where it was ﬁrst designed by a KPMG employee on secondment to the department
(Rutter et al. 2017, p. 56). In 2009, Labour also established the Oﬃce for Life Sciences (OLS; a govern-
ment agency whose work is shaped by its private sector ‘stakeholders’), which published the ﬁrst ‘life
sciences strategy’ in 2011, under the coalition (see OLS 2011). The OLS will now sit underneath a Life
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Sciences Council (co-chaired by cabinet ministers for business and health, and the chief executive of
AstraZeneca), which will be overseen by a cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister (House of
Lords Science and Technology Committee 2018a).
Although the white paper insists ‘[t]he role of the government is not to pick favourites and sub-
sidise or protect them’ (BEIS 2017c, p. 165), sector deals are clearly creating opportunities for powerful
incumbent ﬁrms to shape industrial policy measures. Deals rely on self-organisation by the largest
ﬁrms, and indeed the ﬁrst criterion new sector deals must meet is having ‘an identiﬁable leader
who can bring together an appropriately broad representation of the sector… The sector’s leader
or deal champion should generally be a single individual with suﬃcient authority in the industry
to negotiate a deal’s content directly with government ministers with the full backing of the
sector they represent’ (BEIS 2017c, p. 208). There is a sleight of hand in the government’s rhetoric
in this regard: they may not be picking winners, but they are creating space for incumbents to
embed themselves in public initiatives, with limited safeguards to ensure they will actually deliver
society-wide beneﬁts in return. As May said in a 2016 speech to the Confederation of British Industry,
the industrial strategy ‘is not about picking winners… It is about backing those winners all the way’
(May 2016a). Tellingly, Britain’s own competition watchdog warned May in 2017 against the ‘unin-
tended consequences’ of sector deals, that is, the possibility of public investment being ‘diverted
from more productive ﬁrms (that sit outside the supported sector) to less productive ﬁrms (that sit
inside the supported sector)’ (Competition and Markets Authority 2017,p. 15).
Accordingly, for example, the automotive sector deal is led by the chief executive of engineering
giant GKN (in the process of being taken over by asset-stripper Melrose) and the creative industries
sector deal is led by Facebook’s vice-president for Europe, the Middle East and Africa (the same indi-
vidual is also a member of a new oﬃcial advisory body, the Industrial Strategy Council). Interestingly,
while it was presented in the white paper as an ‘agreed’ deal, the publication of a detailed construc-
tion sector deal has been delayed due to the collapse of Carillion. At the time of writing, it is also not
clear who will sign the deal on behalf of the industry, since the chair of the Construction Leadership
Council, Andrew Wolstenholme, subsequently stepped down from his role as chief executive of
Crossrail (a private company wholly owned by Transport for London) to join BAE Systems. The coun-
cil’s board includes senior executives from Saint-Gobain UK, Turner & Townsend, Arup and the Mace
Group.
Touted as a robust form of vertical support for innovative industries, sector deals in practice
embody some of the most unwelcome features of verticalism, insofar as they favour incumbent
ﬁrms able, and seemingly very willing, to participate in the deal-making process. There seem to be
few barriers to which industries may be able to pitch to government for support, or indeed which
groups of ﬁrms are able to deﬁne themselves as a sector to qualify for support. Given the decline
of collective bargaining in Britain, most employer organisations, overwhelmingly organised by self-
deﬁned sectoral groupings, exist largely for the purpose of political lobbying (Gooberman et al,
2018). If these organisations are to be the basis of future sector deals, we can expect few deals
that incorporate innovative, disruptive ﬁrms which challenge existing market leaders, and conven-
tional sectoral boundaries in the process. There is of course no suggestion that the public purse
might beneﬁt – beyond the normal forms of taxation, although even these are partially avoidable
for some of the ﬁrms involved – from any proﬁts which derive from an activity supported by
sector deal, or that the beneﬁciaries might be held accountable for how they use public funds.
That said, the amounts being invested by the public sector are typically quite small; their real signiﬁ-
cance may lie in a recasting of what industrial policy means, at least in the British context, insofar as
they validate targeted support for particular industries – as long as this support is ﬁltered through
incumbent-led governance processes.
Clearly, as they are legitimised as agents of industrial strategy, it is no surprise that the business
models of private sector organisations are not considered by the government to be within the
scope of industrial policy. This is despite the fact that policy-makers have since the crisis often
bemoaned the chronically low rate of business investment in Britain; private investment as a
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proportion of GDP has been lower in Britain than the rest of the G7 and OECD for most of the past 40
years. Within this, the British economy has a particularly low rate of private R&D investment. We can
perhaps associate this with the dominance of less capital-intense services industries in the British
economy, but also prevailing corporate governance practices (the latter may indeed help to
explain the former) (Deakin 2013). In a 2016 speech, Theresa May actually linked a more intervention-
ist industrial strategy to concerns around corporate governance (May 2016b; May advocated the rep-
resentation of employees on the boards of large ﬁrms, although this commitment was later dropped).
The ‘shareholder value’ model of corporate governance, put on a statutory footing by Tony Blair’s
Labour government, had since the ﬁnancial crisis been associated with short-termist business invest-
ment practice, even within some elite policy discourses. However, a subsequent review of corporate
governance, conducted by BEIS at around the same time the department produced its industrial
strategy green paper, favoured a voluntaristic rather than regulatory approach to reform (BEIS
2017b), and the review was entirely absent from the published industrial strategy.
In contrast, another recent BEIS initiative, a review of employment rights and ‘ﬂexible’ work by
former Blair adviser Matthew Taylor (2017), was actually cited several times in the industrial strategy
white paper. Crucially, the document presents sector deals as a key delivery mechanism for the
review:
Sector Deals provide a further opportunity for employers to promote good work and boost productivity. The right
approach will vary from sector to sector. Delivering better quality jobs could involve a commitment to better
employment relations and contracts that fosters both ﬂexibility and security. (BEIS 2017c, p. 118)
As such, whereas corporate governance is noticeably absent from the industrial strategy, the inclusion
of employment rights in the strategy is used by BEIS to establish a voluntaristic rather than the regu-
latory approach in this area, with sector deals deemed the appropriate forum in which participant
ﬁrms are able to deﬁne ‘good work’. The industrial strategy’s new verticalism is, at best, tentative –
and there are few signs that BEIS intends to pursue a more interventionist horizontal agenda either.
Interestingly, as well as marginalising its own more radical, horizontal agenda, the May govern-
ment appears also to have presided over the dissolution of some of the more conventional forms
of vertical intervention that had been established by the coalition government. Catapult centres,
for instance, were designed to function as networked R&D hubs, initially funded by the public
sector before attracting innovative SMEs seeking access to shared resources. The centres covered
growth areas such as advanced manufacturing, oﬀshore energy, satellite technology and digital
industries. However, a review of the catapult programme by accountancy ﬁrm Ernst & Young
(2017; commissioned by the May government in 2017) criticised centres for not attracting
suﬃcient volumes of private investment. Their future is therefore uncertain.
The Treasury’s Productivity Agenda
It is a highly revealing oddity of British economic statecraft that while the Whitehall department
which oversees business generally ‘owns’ industrial policy (now more than ever, given the creation
of BEIS), the Treasury actually retains ownership of productivity policy. As such, a commitment to hor-
izontalism remains evident in parts of the May government’s agenda. Furthermore, the Treasury has
actually sought to adopt the notion of industrial strategy to facilitate this objective.
Crucially, despite the creation of BEIS and the publication of its industrial strategy white paper, the
Treasury’s ‘productivity plan’ remains in force. The Treasury’s departmental plan includes productivity
as a central responsibility, noting horizontal issues such as improving infrastructure and the business
environment as key concerns, alongside supporting high growth ﬁrms (citing both the BEIS white
paper and its own, earlier 2017 budget in this regard (HM Treasury 2018b)). The productivity plan
(published as Fixing the Foundations under then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne in
2015) had explicitly replaced the previous ‘plan for growth’ jointly owned by Osborne and Vince
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Cable (the Business Secretary, and a Liberal Democrat) under the coalition (see HM Treasury 2015),
quite deliberately eschewing the Cable-inspired industrial policies contained in the earlier plan.
In 2016, Philip Hammond established the National Productivity Investment Fund, in order to
repackage the Treasury’s ongoing housing, transport and infrastructure investment – a largely hori-
zontal approach, although some additional funds for R&D were also announced. The 2018 budget
updated the productivity plan, with a focus on housing and transport infrastructure investment
(HM Treasury 2018a). Remarkably, Hammond also announced the Industrial Strategy Challenge
Fund (ISCF) for R&D (discussed further below), a key part of the BEIS agenda, well in advance of
BEIS’ industrial strategy. Interestingly, the ISCF adopted some of the rhetoric of industrial targeting,
albeit with a wide array of potential industries to support. However, the second wave of the ISCF has
now been largely reconciled with BEIS’s the four ‘grand challenges’ outlined in the white paper.
The Treasury is pursuing other productivity policies quite separately from BEIS. A good example is
‘Be the Business’ (BTB), an outreach project which grew out of the Treasury’s Productivity Leadership
Group chaired by Charlie Mayﬁeld (chair of the retail giant the John Lewis Group). BTB is actually cited
several times in the BEIS white paper, but its work seemingly bears no imprint of either the grand
challenges and has little or no overlap with sector deals. The project’s focus is on organisational
improvements among SMEs, particularly in human resources management. BTB’s chief executive,
Tony Danker (a former Treasury special adviser who subsequently became strategy lead for the Guar-
dian Media Group) describes his role as leading ‘the productivity movement’ (cited in BTB 2018). With
few resources, BTB’s main work involves recruiting large employers (irrespective of their industrial
location) to showcase their own productivity-enhancing processes for smaller employers in the
same locality.
City Deals and Local Government
‘Place’ plays a pronounced role, discursively, in Britain’s new industrial strategy –with potential ramiﬁ-
cations for neoliberal statecraft. The concept is used to associate industrial strategy with a concern
with certain types of inequality (perhaps constituting a policy objective alongside economic goals
such as growth and productivity), and imply that a degree of state restructuring is inherent in the
new industrial strategy, insofar as it overlaps with the highly developed English devolution
agenda. However, there is little sense that the new strategy oﬀers a departure from the practice of
the coalition government in this regard. The 2017 white paper establishes ‘local industrial strategies’,
but the agenda is rather thin. May argued her strategy will ‘identify the places that have the potential
to contribute to economic growth and become the homes to millions of new jobs’ (May 2016b). This
appears to render local economic development subservient to the national objectives, and the white
paper itself is imbibed with a narrative of local self-reliance, arguing that many local areas are failing
to ‘fulﬁl their potential’, which can be corrected ‘if they have the right policies and approach’ (BEIS
2017c, p. 216–7; emphasis added). This section considers the emergence of Local Enterprise Partner-
ships (LEPs) under the coalition, and then the emergence of local industrial strategies in the context
of other deals between central and local government. Again, we ﬁnd the Treasury an inﬂuential pres-
ence (to say the least), with the vagueness of the industrial strategy’s commitment actually providing
fertile ground for the reseeding of neoliberal norms via new framings such as spatial agglomeration
theory.
The Emergence of Local Enterprise Partnerships
Traditionally, most conventional industrial policies in Britain have operated in a ‘place-blind’ manner;
we would perhaps expect de jure place-blindness from horizontal industrial policy interventions, even
if this results de facto in privileging certain cities and regions (above all, the ‘golden triangle’ of
London, Oxford and Cambridge) (see Barca et al. 2012, Hildreth and Bailey, 2014, Flanagan and
Wilsdon 2018). New Labour partially bucked this trend by creating Regional Development Agencies
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(RDAs), but these operated separately from conventional industrial policy mechanisms. One of the
coalition government’s earliest decisions was the abolition of the Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs), to be partially replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). There had been RDAs in
every English region, but their purpose was essentially defensive rather than strategic, insofar as
they sought to mitigate deindustrialisation in disadvantaged regions through subsidies for venture
capital, export ﬁnance, etc. They had few substantive powers, but many were relatively well-
resourced (until Labour’s third term in oﬃce), and managed EU structural funds granted to English
regions. (Similar arrangements existed in the devolved nations, albeit organised through new demo-
cratic processes – although development agencies in Scotland and Wales had as few industrial policy
powers as the English RDAs.) The coalition government’s experiments with vertical or targeted indus-
trial policy largely maintained a place-blind orientation (Berry 2018a).
The central question here is whether the May government’s apparent determination to build a
‘place-based’ industrial strategy served to mainstream targeted support for local economic develop-
ment within industrial policy mechanisms. Experience to date suggests not. The May government
developed few, if any, substantive initiatives on local economic development, and has been
wedded to the coalition’s LEP-based model. LEPs are generally organised on a city-regional basis,
although a bottom-up approach to organisation means many are based on rather odd geographies;
in some cases, single city-regions are covered by several LEPs (Jones 2013). Whereas RDAs were gov-
ernment agencies, LEPs are designed to represent a partnership between local authorities and local
business leaders, with the latter occupying the key governance positions. (It is worth noting that
business leaders were also well-represented on RDA boards, and unelected assemblies which
oversaw RDAs, so the LEP governance model has an element of continuity in this regard).
The main, tangible implication of LEPs in relation to place-based industrial strategy is the withdra-
wal of public funds. All of the powers and budgets associated with RDAs transferred back to the
central government in 2010, including the management of EU funds. LEPs rely on local authorities
– suﬀering enormous budget costs after 2010 – for running costs, and have no permanent capital
budgets. LEPs were invited to apply to the new £1.5 billion Regional Growth Fund, in tandem with
private sector partners, and funding opportunities grew throughout the coalition era, albeit in a
messy, piecemeal manner. The crucial role of LEPs (and their private sector representatives) in disci-
plining local authorities should also be noted. LEPs have been implicated in new forms of central con-
ditionality imposed by government; for instance, when local authorities were oﬀered the opportunity
to raise local taxes to pay for infrastructure (tax rises for local public services were forbidden), the
Treasury insisted that the business representatives on LEP boards had to agree (even where local
authority and LEP boundaries were not contiguous). While there are continuities between RDAs
and LEPs in terms of business inﬂuence, it is clear that that creation of the latter created new oppor-
tunities for private sector representatives to contribute to the local governance, which will persist
even as some LEPs are incorporated into new metro-mayoral structures following Devolution
Deals (discussed below).
From Deal-based Devolution to ‘Local Industrial Strategy’
After the establishment of LEPs, the coalition and May governments have both engaged in a quite
bewildering deal-making process with local elites, as the Treasury extended its authority in this
area, employing governance-by-deal to propel its English devolution agenda, in much the same
way the department’s authority is exercised within Whitehall (Gray et al. 2018). City Deals between
the central government and local authorities (with LEP support) were supplemented by Local
Growth Deals between the central government and LEPs, and then by Devolution Deals between
central government and groups of ‘combined’ local authorities in conjunction with the establishment
of directly elected metro-mayors. Again, the new industrial strategy oﬀers no substantive challenge
to this approach.
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City Deals oﬀered small amounts of additional public investment (£2.3 billion in total, over 30
years, in the ﬁrst and largest wave (Ward 2017)) in some key industries, often focused on skills pro-
vision, and often in return for the easing of planning restrictions. There were some interesting tax
innovations in the ﬁrst wave of City Deals 2012-2014, for the ‘core cities’ excluding London, with a
business rate (a local tax administered nationally) retention scheme in Bristol for tax revenue
which surpassed projections, an ‘earn back’ model in Manchester where the city was rewarded
ﬁscally for improvements in output, and the freedom to borrow against future business rate
revenue in Sheﬃeld. In a typically British oddity, Scottish and Welsh cities later began to broker
deals directly with the Treasury, bypassing devolved national administrations.
Local Growth Deals were announced in 2013, and to date have led to the allocation of more than
£7 billion in public funds to LEPs, although much of this from existing budgets. The focus of these
deals has been regional transport investments, although they overlap with City Deal priorities in
many areas. The National Audit Oﬃce (2016) has strongly criticised the programme based on LEPs’
inability to manage the new funds, and the short-term incentives arising from the Treasury’s insis-
tence on annual expenditure management. Again, Local Growth Deals have been extended to Scot-
land and Wales, despite the absence of LEPs outside England.
Devolution Deals have proceeded extremely haphazardly. They generally involve the devolution
of fewer resources (with the major exception of Manchester, which over the course of several deals
has agreed to administer NHS spending), albeit with an extension of new tax powers in some areas,
but constitute a reorganisation of local government through the establishment of metro-mayors
within city-regions. Mayors, in collaboration with constituent local authorities, will have control
over the local operation of transport, training and employment programmes which had before
been centrally managed. Inevitably, diﬀerent mayoral models have been adopted in diﬀerent
cities, but a mayor is now a pre-requisite of any further devolution by the Treasury. Half of a new
£1.7 billion Transforming Cities Fund, announced alongside the industrial strategy, will be allocated
directly to mayoral city-regions on a per capita basis, even though only six cities are currently eligible
(the rest of the fund will be allocated by open competition). A similar model will be put in place for
the Stronger Towns Fund (STF), seemingly established to support very disadvantaged towns and
small cities in response to the likely loss of EU investments. The STF will actually be delivered via
city-based metro-mayors and/or LEPs and represents a reallocation of expenditure within existing
departmental budgets rather than a new investment (Smith 2019).
The local government reform agenda has been propelled by the vogueish notion of ‘agglomera-
tion’, an evolution of notions of industrial ‘clustering’, albeit more appropriate to a deindustrialising
economy. Agglomeration theory invokes the inexorable accumulation of economic activity within
large urban centres. It has been promoted most vociferously in public discourse by think-tanks
such as Centre for Cities (whose former director, Alex Jones, is now a senior government oﬃcial
working across BEIS and MHCLG, focused on the place-based industrial policy). While, in a basic
sense, urban agglomeration can be observed empirically in economies like Britain, the theory has
attracted extensive criticism from more critical economic geographers, for overlooking the (transna-
tional) structural context which is driving growth in large cities, clear evidence of growing inequalities
within city-regions and, most importantly, the role of the public sector in supporting local economic
activity. In emphasising a marketised processes or business reterritorialisation, agglomeration theory,
at its crudest, lends weight to a set of policy prescriptions in which the public sector is simply asked to
make way for the private sector, with the state expected to play a very limited role (Martin et al., 2016,
Martin and Gardner 2018).
Moreover, agglomeration invariably masquerades, as neoliberal programmes often do, as a purely
pragmatic approach to supporting growth (for instance, the What Works Centre for Local Economic
Growth is a key conduit for agglomeration theory’s inﬂuence within national and local government).
The Treasury’s 2015 productivity plan emphasises the role of transport infrastructure and relaxed
planning restrictions (primarily for housing) ‘in fostering the agglomeration economies that make
cities work’ (2015, p. 29). This seemingly neutral observation was, however, entirely absent from
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the coalition era ‘plan for growth’, in which the term ‘agglomeration’ and its variants do not appear,
despite a strong emphasis on geographical rebalancing. Crucially, agglomeration is not necessarily a
perspective imposed on local government by the Treasury and central government more generally;
local elites are also largely content to develop their own policy agendas within an agglomeration-
inspired framework (Giovannini 2018, Gray et al. 2018). In practice, local economic development in
Britain remains a rather anarchic domain, with Britain’s disadvantaged regions remaining vulnerable
to the ‘repositioning’ decisions of inward investors and the evolution of transnational value chains
(Driﬃeld et al. 2012). Local authorities have few powers to shape these processes, and agglomeration
theory would arguably render illegitimate any attempt to do so.
It is in this context that the inclusion of ‘local industrial strategies’ in the industrial strategy white
paper must be understood. The May government asked Manchester and Birmingham to pilot their
own locally-speciﬁc industrial strategies, framed by the white paper’s grand challenges. Through
these strategies, local areas will ‘make the most’ of existing strengths, and develop ‘new ways of
working’ among local institutions and between central and local leaders (BEIS, 2017b, 138, 221).
However, the initiative will not involve the devolution of any additional economic policy powers
to the local level, and no additional funding will be made available. The ambition is simply that
metro-mayors will use an industrial strategy framing to co-ordinate their expenditure (and future
resources requests) around local economic development. As the October 2018 ‘progress statement’
on Manchester’s strategy makes clear:
Government and Greater Manchester are clear that the Local Industrial Strategy will set out an agreed and shared
view of the opportunities for Greater Manchester, as well as the challenges that will need to be addressed, to
maximise its contribution to UK productivity and earnings growth. The Local Industrial Strategy will not imply
any new spending commitments, but will inform the strategic use of local funding streams and, where relevant,
spending from national schemes. (HM Government and GMCA 2018, p. 17)
Local industrial strategies will not usurp the deal-based relationship between central and local gov-
ernment and are arguably subservient to this relationship. At worst, the instruction to develop their
own industrial strategy using current rather than new resources will serve as a further exercise in dis-
ciplining by the centre, with access to resources policed by the ‘agreed and shared view’ (cited above)
between central and local government. While the establishment of directly elected mayors implies an
element of democratisation in the devising of local economic plans, in practice the scope of mayoral
authority is rather narrow (and economistic), arguably narrower than that enjoyed by local authorities
in England.
Furthermore, there is a danger that the industrial strategy’s rather vague sense of ‘place-ness’ actu-
ally serves to reinforce inequalities in public investment across Britain’s nations and regions. For
example, the Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge corridor, noted above, will also now be developing
a local industrial strategy. As such, a region which can have expected to receive signiﬁcant public
support for its industries as a matter of routine, given its perceived signiﬁcance to the national
economy, can now justify this support ideologically on the same grounds as the support which
more disadvantaged regions might receive. The turn to place in the May government’s industrial
strategy was not only insubstantial; by failing to challenge the approach to devolution established
in the coalition era, it may even have served to further embed a development model in which
central government accepts limited responsibility for geographical inequalities.
Innovation Funding and Universities
Britain’s productivity problem, and indeed general economic malaise, is often attributed to a failure to
adequately ﬁnance innovation in the private sector. This section considers policy developments
ostensibly aimed at addressing this problem – ﬁrstly in relation to small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), and then funding for science and research more generally (including higher education).
While generally discussed in technocratic terms, the scope of government interventions in this area
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potentially tells us something quite profound about understandings of how state and market should
interact across diﬀerent stages of capital accumulation.
It is worth noting initially that, in terms of allocating capital to productive activities, ﬁnance sector
practices have been largely untouched by British policy-makers since the ﬁnancial crisis, beyond the
limited moves towards macroprudential regulation designed to reduce risk within the banking sector
(see Baker 2013). Proposals for public investment banks (now supported by the Labour opposition)
have been resisted. Banks taken into public ownership after the crisis have been managed at arms-
length and are now being privatised; the Green Investment Bank set up by the coalition (despite its
name, actually a modest investment fund) has also been privatised (Craig 2018). A recent inquiry into
‘patient capital’ by the Treasury in 2017 oﬀered virtually no criticism of the banking sector, capital
markets or regulatory practice (see HM Treasury 2017a, 2017b).
Innovation Finance for SMEs
Interventions in this area have focused on ‘access to ﬁnance’ for SMEs, deemed unable to take on
growth risks due to a shortage of suitable capital. The most important initiative, the Bank of England’s
Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), which ran from 2012 to early 2018, essentially subsidised the
lending activity of British banks and building societies, enabling loans valued at around £100
billion. However, FLS funds were used predominantly to subsidise mortgage lending. The Bank
adapted FLS to mitigate this bias in 2014 but then introduced in 2016 the similar Term Funding
Scheme, enabling a continuation of mortgage support. The much smaller Enterprise Finance Guaran-
tee is focused on small business lending (now delivered by the British Business Bank (BBB), discussed
below). Local growth hubs also support access to ﬁnance, albeit through ﬁnancial mediation rather
than lending. Many of the local and smaller-scale initiatives rely currently on EU funds.
The BBB, set up by the coalition, now forms the key organ of public support for SME ﬁnance. The
BBB is a BEIS subsidiary, but its funds were recently supplemented by a £2.5 billion grant from the
Treasury, also announced in advance of the BEIS white paper, and designated as a ‘patient capital’
fund (and as such an outcome of the Treasury’s review). The BBB’s principal role is to arrange third
party ﬁnance for start-up companies, subsidised by government guarantees, with a mission to
‘unlock’ private ﬁnance via the shouldering of risk by the public sector. This work is technically under-
taken by British Business Investments (BBI), the BBB’s commercial wing. While the BBB’s objectives,
and therefore resources, are fairly modest, the organisation is interesting insofar as it reﬂects
British policy-makers’ apparent veneration of ﬁnance sector practices. The BBB explicitly privileges
private sector experience among its oﬃcials, and BBI is staﬀed by a range of managers from corporate
ﬁnance and accountancy backgrounds. The chief executive of the BBB (who also chairs BBI) has spent
most of his career in the American banking industry, and BBI’s chief executive was recruited from the
asset management industry. BBB salaries are generally commensurate with those in senior manage-
ment roles in the ﬁnance sector; the chief executive earns signiﬁcantly more than double the salary
earned by the chief executive of NHS England (which has a budget of £116 billion).
It is worth noting also that the British state also commits signiﬁcant resources (but much less
fanfare) to support innovation in the form of venture capital tax relief. The three main schemes
(the Enterprise Investment Scheme, the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme and the Venture
Capital Trust) cost around £1 billion per year in tax foregone. In general, venture capital in Britain
is highly dependent on public funding (including BBB and EU programmes; see British Private
Equity and Venture Capital Association 2015). Tax relief is ostensibly designed to address this, but
the Treasury’s own ‘patient capital’ review cited evidence on the ineﬀectiveness of up-front tax
relief, stemming from its tendency to subsidise investment at developmental stages other than
the crucial, riskiest scale-up phase (HM Treasury 2017a, p. 37; see also Lerner 2012, European Com-
mission 2017). Nevertheless, the review ultimately expanded the scope of tax reliefs, principally by
increasing the investment allowance limits within which tax relief applies (HM Treasury 2017b).
Even if we accept their public good function at face value, the extent to which schemes are promoted
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by ﬁnancial advisers and ‘wealth managers’ indicates an important secondary function as a tax man-
agement tool by very wealthy individuals.
The Creation of UK Research and Innovation
Science and research funding has also increasingly been framed by the innovation motif, albeit
without the predominant focus on SMES, and as such is now presented as a key part of the industrial
strategy. InnovateUK, ﬁrst set up as the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) under New Labour, manages
a large number of very small investment funds, focused on R&D in technological innovation. Starting
life as an advisory body for a previous incarnation of BEIS (and therefore predominantly composed of
people from the private sector), the TSB/InnovateUK operated independently of the research councils
for academic institutions – but the May government decided to merge InnovateUK and the main
seven research councils into the new UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) agency. UKRI will have an
annual budget of around £6 billion, incorporating the previous InnovateUK and research council allo-
cations, but also the new Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (ISCF), which has an annual budget of
around £1.2 billion, initially for four years. The ISCF is designed to subsidise business-led R&D.
The overall intention is for UKRI to co-ordinate between the previously separate bodies, to engen-
der a more strategic approach to innovation funding. This strategic approach is likely to entail a
funding bias towards government’s favoured missions (or industries) rather than the general
science base, and the further promotion of a business-led model of technological development, par-
ticularly in relation to universities (see UKRI 2017). The ISCF is the most explicit link between science
policy and May’s new industrial strategy, although, as noted above, it was announced separately, by
the Treasury, originally with a range of industrial missions distinct from the grand challenges which
later emerged. The ISCF appears to have no place-related allocation criteria. It is perhaps worth noting
that, while UKRI’s governance structures are largely populated by academics (a legacy of research
council autonomy), only 1 of 16 board members is based outside London or the South East. The
extent to which UKRI will maintain the place-blindness of its constitutive institutions (and therefore
favour investments in already-aﬄuent areas) is a source of tension within elite thinking (see House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2017). Certainly, the merger will probably increase the
inﬂuence of business considerations on the academic research councils. InnovateUK’s deputy director
for strategy, Dan Hodges (2019), recently described the agency, which manages the ISCF, as a ‘voice
for business within Whitehall’, and highlighted separate work with the Better Regulation Executive on
removing regulatory barriers to business innovation. Upon launching the ISCF in 2017, InnovateUK’s
chief executive Ruth McKenna said the programme ‘will deliver the science that business needs’
(cited in BEIS 2017a).
UKRI clearly reinforces the long-standing trend towards commercialisation in higher education,
which advanced signiﬁcantly under the coalition government. The most signiﬁcant implication of
the industrial strategy is perhaps that it provides ideological corroboration in this regard, by
entrenching a (neoliberal) view of the essential purpose of universities. The terms ‘university’, ‘univer-
sities’ or ‘higher education’ occur more than a hundred times in the white paper, generally in abstract
rather than as reference to a speciﬁc institution, and often to vaguely indicate the local dimension of a
particular initiative or objective. Universities are deemed key partners in local industrial strategies,
based on the observation that strong universities tend to support urban agglomeration within
cities (BEIS 2017c, p. 217, 221). Lobbying body Universities UK (2017) subsequently welcomed the
white paper very strongly, even producing promotional material, aimed at private ﬁrms, on the
role universities could play in sector deals. The need for academic research to serve an immediate,
societal (generally, commercial) purpose had already been ﬁrmly established by ‘impact’ require-
ments in the Research Excellence Framework and general research council practice (major sources
of university income), and will be further reinforced by the proposed Knowledge Exchange Frame-
work (KEF). Launching the KEF, which will measure universities’ eﬀectiveness in business engage-
ment, then science minister Jo Johnson said:
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Universities have a vital role to play in their local communities and in the national economy. Given the record
levels of public investment in R&D, it is essential that universities engage with businesses and communities to
make the most of their knowledge and research. There are great examples of this across the country but the
system needs to ﬁnd a new gear. (cited in HEFCE and BEIS 2017)
At the same time, even research-intense institutions are under pressure to deliver higher quality (or
more bespoke) learning experiences for students – a near inevitable consequence of increasing
annual tuition fees to close to £10,000 – and regulated as such through the new Ofﬁce for Students
and Teaching Excellence Framework. The commercialisation of research and consumerisation of
teaching might pull universities in different directions operationally, but in rendering universities pri-
marily economic institutions, they are two sides of the same neoliberal coin.
This is not to suggest that greater links between higher education and the private sector are inher-
ently problematic; indeed such links, marrying purposeful research and business innovation, would
be integral to a functioning industrial policy framework. The coalition’s catapult centres programme,
discussed above, arguably promised such a partnership but was relatively under-funded (certainly
compared to the ISCF). We are now seeing the emergence of a higher education business model
whereby revenues are high, but income is increasingly contingent upon delivering against short-
term metrics related to research dissemination and student recruitment. As the inﬂation in pay for
senior executive suggests, today’s university leaders have strong ﬁnancial incentives to sustain this
lucrative model – the vast majority of university vice-chancellors, for instance, now also earn signiﬁ-
cantly more than the NHS chief executive (Times Higher Education 2018). The way this success is
delivered, increasingly through marketised and competitive processes, is also fuelling competition
between universities (The Economist 2017). Greater competition, and commercialisation more gener-
ally, may well strengthen the incentive for universities to support innovative activity in the wider
economy – but whether it results in a greater capacity to do so remains to be seen. The key impli-
cation, however, from this article’s perspective, is that, like other parts of the pre-crisis state machin-
ery, universities as delivery institutions have been able to adapt to the new industrial strategy
(seemingly without jeopardising current operating models), while also utilise new industrial policy
agendas to reinforce and legitimise these models.
Conclusion
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis encouraged some British policy elites to endorse substantive industrial pol-
icies, culminating in the May government’s development of a comprehensive industrial strategy in
2017. At a basic level, industrial policy, with its legitimation of state intervention to steer accumulation
processes, is an ideational challenger to neoliberalism in its purest form. Does the emergence of an
industrial strategy as a key element of economic statecraft in post-crisis Britain represent the receding
of neoliberalism, or is there evidence that neoliberalism in Britain has demonstrated resilience in the
wake of its perceived failure in 2008? There is clearly an element of neoliberal retreat in the agenda
pursued by May and a handful of other leading Conservative politicians, building upon some of the
agenda developed by the coalition government (albeit largely due to the Liberal Democrats’
inﬂuence). Yet the ideational challenge remains rather thin.
However, the ideational power of neoliberalism is not a suﬃcient explanation for neoliberal resi-
lience in this regard; two other factors are especially relevant. Firstly, the institutional realm and the
strategies of those occupying key policy and delivery functions. The Treasury remains enormously
powerful regarding all aspects of economic statecraft in Britain and, despite both the ﬁnancial
crisis and the Brexit vote, continues to project the broadly neoliberal and ﬁnance-centred agenda
which, while adaptable, has underpinned its operations and decisions for decades (Ingham 1984,
Gamble 1994, Matthijs 2012, Johal et al. 2014, Craig 2018, Lee 2018, Ringe and Rollings 2000). Insti-
tutional power obviously overlaps with ideational power, evident in the inﬂuence of new(ish) ideas
such as ‘agglomeration’ in May’s industrial strategy in relation to local economies, and the apparent
entrenchment of a narrow view of productivity. Both are consistent with neoliberalism. This raises an
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intriguing question over whether the rhetorical support by May for substantive industrial policies has
paradoxically strengthened the credibility of the Treasury’s narrower agenda, by providing a post-
neoliberal cover for a familiar set of ideas.
The institutional mechanisms for delivering the industrial strategy are decisive too – principally
BEIS agencies and subsidiaries, local government and related bodies, and higher education. Insofar
as they are integrated into an industrial strategy, institutions such as local authorities and universities
can be said to be being reoriented towards the strategic delivery of certain public goods. At the same
time, however, their purpose in this regard is being refashioned as predominantly economic, as they
are inﬂuenced by new agendas around local growth and productivity. Such developments cut across
the horizontal/vertical divide, and are not straightforward cases of neoliberalisation – but nor can we
conclude that they represent a post-neoliberal shift.
The new industrial strategy establishes ‘grand challenges’ designed to inﬂuence the state’s role in
shaping capitalist development, yet they will be delivered primarily by sector deals and the ISCF,
which prioritise business perspectives and incumbent interests. Sector deals and LEPs in fact
create new opportunities for business-led governance within the public sector. Even where the
state appears to be more active, through institutions such as InnovateUK and the BBB, private
sector practices are either incorporated or replicated. There is a ﬁne line between the development
of interventionist mechanisms which shape capitalist development, and the outsourcing of inno-
vation risks by capitalists to the public sector. The marginalisation of corporate governance and
wider ﬁnance sector reform within the industrial strategy suggests that, as it stands, British industrial
policy leans towards the latter characterisation. To return to Cornel Ban’s (2016) terminology, while
industrial policy – in utilising public resources to promote and protect national industries – could
be deﬁned as a form of ‘buﬀering’, the economic statecraft of the new industrial strategy is actually
rather ‘disembedded’: ideationally thin, encompassing opportunities for business-led governance,
and delivered by institutional models imposed from the top down.
The second, main factor in neoliberalism’s reseeding via industrial policy in Britain is political cir-
cumstance and contingency. Whereas the coalition government began to develop new industrial
policy mechanisms, the agenda was halted by the Conservative majority government after 2015,
only to resurface after the Brexit vote under Theresa May’s leadership – partly in response to the
vote (although she had strongly supported Vince Cable’s more ambitious plans when Home Secretary
in the coalition government (May 2013)). It is impossible to conclude deﬁnitively about the inﬂuence
of internal Whitehall politicking on the new industrial strategy, especially as key processes are
ongoing and uncertain, but May’s loss of authority within the cabinet was surely relevant to the timid-
ity of her industrial strategy in areas such as corporate governance and the need for place-based pol-
icies, where she had initially seemed to reject approaches which prevailed under the coalition
government.
Despite its role in motivating May’s central agenda, the implementation of the Brexit vote is the
main source of uncertainty regarding the industrial strategy. Since the European single market has
been a key element of the neoliberal variety dominant in Britain from the 1990s onwards, no indus-
trial strategy can ultimately fail to address Brexit. But it is obviously impossible at this stage to predict
how post-Brexit trading relations or new political leadership might serve to further undermine neo-
liberalism, or indeed fertilise a new neoliberal variety. Brexit-related contingencies have already
aﬀected the industrial strategy, insofar as the political chaos caused by the Brexit vote, compounded
by the outcome of the 2017 election – when May, ironically, seemingly sought a mandate for her
more interventionist agenda – has problematised the government’s eﬀectiveness in implementing
its new approach. BEIS became somewhat isolated, as May’s relations with both the Chancellor
(Parker 2019) and the Business Secretary (Maguire 2018) have soured, due to their opposition to a
‘no deal’ Brexit (and junior industrial strategy minister Richard Harrington resigned for the same
reason in March 2019). May’s own departure as Prime Minister in mid-2019 has now created a political
vacuum in this area (noting that the advocates of ‘hard Brexit’ have shown little interest in industrial
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policy), which will probably only enhance the Treasury’s institutional dominance, and reinforce mech-
anisms of neoliberal reseeding, ironically despite the Treasury’s avowed opposition to EU withdrawal.
Note
1. The empirical analysis is based predominantly on policy documents and associated political statements, which
are referenced where appropriate throughout. It draws also upon the author’s extensive interactions with May
government ministers and oﬃcials (and other members of the business and policy communities) during the
development of the industrial strategy white paper in 2017, in his capacity as a member of the Industrial Strategy
Commission. More detail on the Commission’s work is available at http://industrialstrategycommission.org.uk/
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